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Introduction
Since fear and love can hardly exist together, if we must chose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.
--Niccolo Machiavelli
Saddam Hussein was much like Adolf Hitler in his leadership philosophy…the ends justify the means, survival of the fittest, lack of personal empathy, and reduced respect for the value of human life. 2 Both transformed their nations into terrifying totalitarian regimes and undertook large scale acts of aggression upon their neighbors. Yet Hussein was different in two important ways.
First, he has attempted to avoid prolonged conflict and irreparable damage to himself and his nation.
He sued for peace within a few days of taking military action in the Iran-Iraq War and in his invasion of Kuwait. Second, he carries no ideological baggage. For Hussein, ideologies are simply tools to use to accomplish an end, such as becoming a more devout Muslim to garner support from religious leaders. 3 In the end, Hussein's most important objective is personal power-maintaining and expanding it.
After the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, Saddam Hussein and his regime came under attack from the new Iranian leadership. In the period leading to the conflict, Iranian fundamentalists were openly advocating his overthrow and were providing arms to Iraqi insurgents. Hussein's primary motivation in invading Iran was to defend himself from Iranian aggression. 4 However, he was also an ambitious opportunist who attempted to take advantage of the turmoil in Iran to secure areas adjacent to Iraq. 5 Occupying these areas could accomplish secondary objectives of gaining complete control of the Shat-al-Arab waterway, enlisting the support of Iraqi friendly populations inside Iran, consolidating his power within Iraq, and building prestige for himself within the Arab community. With these objectives in mind, this paper will discuss Saddam Hussein's national security strategy, his military strategy and his effectiveness with them during the Iran-Iraq War.
II.
Saddam's National Security Strategy on the Eve of the War
War, therefore, is an act of policy. Were it a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would be of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature… If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration when conducting it.
--Carl Von Clausewitz
Typical of many tyrants, Saddam Hussein was both the nation's political and military leader.
He understood policy to be supreme. For better or worse, being both enabled him to rapidly change his objectives in adjusting to battlefield success or failure. 7 Sometimes this makes it difficult to distinguish between political and military objectives, or between political and military strategy. For
Saddam, it meant too easily shifting emphasis from one to the other, sometimes at the expense of one, and ultimately, both.
A. The Domestic and Regional Environment Khomeini's ideas threatened other Gulf States, both internally (revolution/revolt) and externally (an Iranian-dominated Gulf). Understandably, the Iranian revolution was not viewed favorably by the Sunni-ruled Gulf entities, which feared that Iranian-generated Shia agitation might disrupt their regimes and oil-based economies. Iran enjoyed greater resources to draw upon-it is three times larger than Iraq in population and land, and dwarfs the other Gulf States. Of particular concern to
Iraq was the possibility that Iran may attempt to actually annex Bahrain, which was 70 percent Shia.
Destabilization in Bahrain could be used as a "reason" to attack Iraqi shipping and directing blows at the Iraqi economy. 18 Shared concern about Iran led to an improvement in Iraq's relations with the other Gulf States in 1979. Saddam offered to provide the manpower to protect the Gulf if others provided funding. Some states, to include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, accepted Saddam's offer and sent money.
By 1980, Khomeini's regime had shown that it could disrupt Iraq. There was speculation that Iranian leaders exporting revolution hoped to annex Shia areas (for example, the holy cities of Najaf and Sharbala) and support Shia opposition efforts to topple Saddam's government. 19 Iran threatened Iraq's basic national security interests: (1) the survival and stability of the Ba'athist regime; (2) the state's physical security against the efforts of internal and external opposition groups; and (3) overall economic prosperity as the foundation of secular state power. The Iranian revolution had clearly changed the nature of the threat environment.
Saddam's overriding concern was to maintain power, and he was willing to go to war to 
III. Saddam's Military Strategy
If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it; yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and insofar as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them 33 .
--Carl Von Clausewitz
As noted Saddam Hussein was both the political and military leader. It was he who allowed the political aim to be tyrant at the beginning of the war. 34 Instead of his initial military strategy dealing a mortal blow to the Iranian Army, he restricted his army's goals, means and targets.
Saddam's mistaken belief about weak Iranian will was compounded by his failure to grasp the operational requirements of such a campaign. Rather than allowing his forces the freedom to advance until they had won a decisive victory, Saddam halted them within a week and announced he was willing to talk. 35 The political decision not to exploit early success resulted in dire consequences and reversed the course of the war. It saved the Iranian Army from decisive defeat, allowed the Iranian Army precious time to regroup and reorganize, and devastated Iraqi Army morale. More importantly it did nothing to threaten Khomeini and actually provided him a platform to launch his revolution to areas outside Iran. 36 Although he would do better adapting policy to military realities later in the war, his failure to do so at the start resulted in disaster and unnecessary suffering. Centers of Gravity. Hussein assessed the primary center of gravity to be the Iranian will to fight. However, he was unable to affect Iranian will in the short term. Iran in revolution, even with a military in some chaos, was more than willing to aggressively defend and pursue a conventional war. In the long term, however, Hussein was able to effectively impact Iranian will and this eventually resulted in a cease-fire agreement. Khomeini determined the Iraqi center of gravity was Saddam Hussein and his goal was to remove him. However, centers of gravity are often centers of strength and well protected. Khomeini was unable to overwhelm Hussein.
B. Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
Assumptions. Both nations made assumptions. Saddam assumed Iran would be unable and/or unwilling to mount a credible defense and agree to quick cease-fire and negotiations. Iran assumed its revolution's fervor and righteousness would be capable of defeating a tyrannical government with a "suppressed" Shia majority. Both assumptions proved erroneous and a protracted conflict resulted. Iran, still in the throes of consolidating revolutionary success, did enjoy a national "passion" which enabled it to rally its people and military for an extended period of time. This also enabled human-wave tactics, which when used as a part of a combined arms assault, became fairly effective.
Balance of
The Iraqi Air Force had been hamstrung by Saddam's paranoia of coup. 42 Saddam only allowed his pilots minimum flying time and this proved costly during the war. Air power was effective only in some roles with marginal performance when directly supporting surface forces.
Lacking the required proficiency, the Iraqis failed to effectively strike the Iranian Air Force during initial attacks 43 , did not assure Iraqi air superiority over its own airspace 44 and was largely unable to conduct combined arms assaults with its army. 45 In many instances, the Iraqi Air Force was held in "strategic reserve." However, Iraqi air power was effective in the role of strategic attack-in striking economically and politically sensitive Iranian targets. In this way air power played a critical role by significantly elevating Iranian "pain" in Saddam's counter-value strategy.
The Iranian Air Force had problems similar to Iraq, but was also hampered by significant parts shortages. While the Iraqi Air Force grew from 335 to 484 aircraft during the conflict, the Iranian Air Force was reduced from 445 aircraft to 90.
46
On the other hand, the Iranian Navy was somewhat effective, keeping Iraqis out of the Gulf and conducting some effective attacks against targets on land. However, Iranian naval effectiveness was limited by its lack of air superiority and unable to stop Iraqi air strikes. Iraqi aircraft routinely controlled the skies over Iranian maritime assets. The Iranian Navy was also constrained by outside powers that would not allow it to deny shipping through the Persian Gulf. 47 The Iraqi Navy was at a disadvantage. For most of the war it did not play a significant role and was bottled up within its own territorial waters. Later in the war, the Iraqis were able to employ in a limited degree. However, Iraqi air power was effective in a maritime role. During 1985 alone, Iraq struck 124 "hostile" maritime targets (often tankers) and conducted 77 major raids against Kharg Island. Saddam used other forces such as air power and surface-to-surface missiles in a countervalue strategy. The important military objectives within his counter-value strategy included important economic nodes-oil refineries, oil tankers, and petroleum storage areas-and eventually the Iranian people themselves. 54 The Iraqi leader used a combination of air power and later in the war, ballistic missiles to accomplish these ends. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq deployed French SuperEntendard aircraft with Exocet missiles to attack oil tankers. Saddam initially launched missiles to attack border cities and later, cities in the heart of Iran, to include Tehran, were attacked. 
